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# Abbreviations

<b>BC</b>	Biometric Cryptosystem
<b>BFS</b>	Boosting Feature Selection
<b>COA</b>	Ciphertext Only Attack
<b>CRC</b>	Cyclic Redundancy Check
<b>DT</b>	Decision Threshold
<b>EER</b>	Equal Error Rate
<b>FAR</b>	False Accept Rate
<b>FMR</b>	False Matching Rate
<b>FNMR</b>	False Non Matching Rate
<b>FRR</b>	False Reject Rate
<b>FTC</b>	Failure To Capture
<b>FTE</b>	Failure To Enroll
<b>IPC</b>	Iris Pseudo Code
<b>MSE</b>	Mean Square Error
<b>OFFC</b>	Orientation Field Flow Curves
<b>PCA</b>	Principal Component Analysis
<b>PPDP</b>	Privacy Preserving Data Publishing
<b>PRNG</b>	Pseudo Random Number Generator
<b>QBBS</b>	Query Based Biometric System
<b>ROC</b>	Receiver Operating Characteristic
<b>RP</b>	Random Projection
<b>SHA</b>	Secure Hash Algorithm



# Symbols

$E(.)$	expectation operator
$\oplus$	XOR operation
$U$	set of biometric system users
$x$	x-coordinate of fingerprint minutiae
$y$	y-coordinate of fingerprint minutiae
$\theta$	angle associated with fingerprint minutiae
$x'$	shifted x-coordinate of fingerprint minutiae
$y'$	shifted y-coordinate of fingerprint minutiae
$\theta'$	angle associated with fingerprint minutiae
$H$	height of an image/feature matrix
$W$	width of an image/feature matrix
$\phi$	hexagonal grid points
$\delta$	equidistant spacing between grid points
$\parallel$	concatenation operation
$\mathcal{H}(\cdot)$	cryptographic hash function
$h(\cdot)$	simple hash function
$J(\cdot, \cdot)$	Jaccard similarity co-efficient
$HD$	hamming distance
$w$	size of an iris codeword
$l$	block size of an iris feature matrix
$S$	feature space
$B$	set of Bloom filters (iris)

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$\mathcal{K}$	key matrix (iris)
$\mathcal{T}$	transformed template matrix (iris)
$\mathbb{B}$	Bloom filter feature vector (iris)
$X_B$	random variable denoting $\mathbb{B}$
$\mathbb{K}$	key feature vector (iris)
$X_K$	random variable denoting $\mathbb{K}$
$\mathbb{T}$	transformed template vector (iris)
$X_T$	random variable denoting $\mathbb{T}$
$H(\cdot)$	information theoretic entropy
$H_\infty(\cdot)$	minimum entropy
$e$	privacy
$X_e$	random variable denoting privacy
$\mathcal{K}_{prv}$	set of private attributes
$X_{prv}$	random variable representing private attributes
$\mathcal{K}_{pub}$	set of public attributes
$X_{pub}$	random variable representing public attributes
$Z$	side information
$X$	set of primary biometric traits
$Y$	set of soft biometric traits
$\epsilon$	privacy controlling parameter
$\Delta f$	global sensitivity
$N$	noise added to QBBS responses
$n$	number of soft biometric traits
$m$	number of query/responses for each soft trait