Dedicated to my Family and Guruji...

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"No one who achieves success does so without acknowledging the help of others. The wise and confident acknowledge this help with gratitude." -Alfred North Whitehead

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Preface

The physical infrastructure, equipment, and facilities are gradually instrumented, controlled, automated, and administered through computerization and possibly internetworking. Such an arrangement is known in the literature as a Cyber-Physical System (CPS). The emerging CPS may range from small-scale industries to large-scale connected systems of diverse areas such as transportation, avionics, defense, entertainment, industrial control system, safety-critical systems, healthcare, *etc.* The cyber components monitor and control the real-world physical devices and infrastructures to improve the quality of services, including reliability and resource utilization.

However, the automation and connectivity of all the networked computing devices increase the security risks and leverage the opportunity to perform successful attacks to compromise system safety with catastrophic effects on human lives and the environment. The attackers compromise the system by exploiting existing vulnerabilities that arise due to inappropriate policies, facilitation to external entities, inefficient and inaccurate protection mechanisms and procedures. Several powerful attacks have been launched on critical infrastructures in recent years, resulting in substantial financial losses, productivity losses, and physical injuries. Protecting Industrial control systems (ICS) from cyber attacks is critical to a country's economic development and social stability. This is an emergent need that security is also considered in the modeling of CPS in general and safety-critical systems in particular. Through a detailed literature survey of existing modeling, analysis, and system organization methods, we find some significant issues and challenges. During development, functionality often takes priority over security. Security measures were implemented late as an add-on resulting in brittle designs that lack proper integration. Further, several techniques are proposed to perform the security analysis in

early phases of the system development life cycle. However, most of these present the qualitative assessment rather than quantitative assessment.

This thesis presents the security modeling and arrangement approaches to overcome these research gaps in the early phases. The first chapter proposes a design-time methodology to map and analyze the system security using Stochastic Petri Nets (SPN) and their fundamental properties. The presented theoretical framework exploits the power of SPN to model the stochastic nature of the system in the presence of external threats. It provides the mathematical support for structural and behavioral analysis to validate the effect of responsive mitigations against security vulnerabilities qualitatively and quantitatively. The effectiveness of the proposed methodology is shown through a case study of Nuclear Power Plant (NPP).

Deploying preventive or responsive measures alone may not be enough to detect, prevent and respond to intrusion attempts and subsequent sophisticated attacks. In the second chapter, we have extended the earlier work, where multiple intrusion prevention and response techniques are applied in place of responsive measures only, and their combined effect on system security and availability are analyzed quantitatively using Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets (GSPN). As SPN suffers from a state explosion problem, GSPN is used to deal with the problem. Moreover, the proposed model helps to prioritize the available security measures.

As CPSs are mostly distributed systems, it is interesting to consider a possible approach for the separation of functionality and security concerns for CPS that are usually organized and created in a distributed manner. In the third chapter, we propose a distributed multi-tier architectural model of CPS and its management as per aspect orientation and leader election as observable in distributed computing systems to improve the CPS performance, security, and functionality management.

List of Publications

- Dipty Tripathi, Lalit Kumar Singh, Anil Kumar Tripathi and Amrita Chaturvedi, "Model based security verification of Cyber-Physical System based on Petrinet: A case study of Nuclear power plant", Annals of Nuclear Energy, 2021, 159, pp.108306. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.anucene.2021.108306, (SCI indexed, Publisher: Elsevier, Impact Factor: 1.77)
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Abbreviations

| \mathbf{AS} | Attack Scenarios |
|------------------------|---|
| BC | Backup Computer |
| BN | Bayesian Networks |
| BFV | Bypass Feedwater Valve |
| $\mathbf{C}\mathbf{C}$ | Control Center |
| CPS | Cyber Physical System |
| DFWCS | \mathbf{D} igital Feed Water Control System |
| \mathbf{DoS} | Denial of Service |
| EMC | Embedded Markov Chain |
| \mathbf{FP} | $\mathbf{F} eedwater \ \mathbf{P} ump$ |
| \mathbf{FM} | $\mathbf{F} unctional \ \mathbf{M} odel$ |
| FMDT | Functional Model under \mathbf{D} oS Threat |
| FMIT | Functional Model under Integrity Threat |
| \mathbf{FMM} | $\mathbf{F} unctional \ \mathbf{M} itigation \ \mathbf{M} odel$ |
| FNR | False Negative Rate |
| FPR | False Positive Rate |
| GSPN | Generalized Stochastic Petri Net |
| ICS-CERT | Industrial Control Systems Computer Emergency Response Team |
| ICT | Information and Communications \mathbf{T} echnology |
| IDS | Intrusion \mathbf{D} etection \mathbf{S} ystem |
| IDRL | Intrusion Detection and Response textbf Layer |
| IoT | Internet of Things |
| | |

| I&C | Instrumentation and Control |
|----------------|---|
| MBSE | \mathbf{M} odel \mathbf{B} ased \mathbf{S} ystem Engineering |
| \mathbf{MC} | Main Computer |
| \mathbf{MFV} | $\mathbf{M}ain \ \mathbf{F}eedwater \ \mathbf{V}alve$ |
| MTTD | \mathbf{M} ean \mathbf{T} ime \mathbf{T} o \mathbf{D} isrupt |
| NIDRS | Network Intrusion Detection and Response System |
| NPP | Nuclear Power Plant |
| PDI | Pressure Differential Indicator |
| \mathbf{PN} | \mathbf{P} etri \mathbf{N} et |
| RCP | Reactor Coolent Pump |
| RG | \mathbf{R} eachability \mathbf{G} raph |
| \mathbf{RQ} | Research Question |
| REMC | \mathbf{R} educed \mathbf{E} mbedded \mathbf{M} arkov \mathbf{C} hain |
| RCICS | Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System |
| SCADA | Supervisory Control and Cyber Physical System |
| SC-CPS | Safety Critical Data Acquisition System |
| SDN | Software Defined Networking |
| \mathbf{SG} | Steam Denerators |
| SPN | Stochastic Petri Net |
| \mathbf{SSP} | Steady State Probability |
| STRIDE | \mathbf{S} poofing Tampering Repudiation Information disclosure |
| | D enial of service E levation of privilege |
| UML | Unified Modeling Language |
| | |

Symbols

| A | set of attributes |
|----------------------|--|
| AR | set of actuators |
| as | attack surface |
| atk_i | attack i |
| av | attack vector |
| Avl | availability |
| C | set of controllers |
| c_ack_id | ack message creator Id |
| c_j | j^{th} cluster |
| $c_x(t)$ | output of controller x at time t |
| CN | set of computing nodes |
| D | set of threat mitigations |
| d_i | firing delay of transition t_i |
| d_{max} | is the maximum diameter of the clusters |
| D_p | preventive defense sequence |
| D_r | responsive defense measures |
| Dia | diameter of graph G |
| DSC | decision support cluster |
| $eini_id$ | election initiator Id |
| f_{Dj} | failure probability of each defence measure Dj against atk_i |
| $failed_leader_id$ | failed leader id |
| FC | set of monitoring and field controller nodes |
| | |

| flc_list_i | a node i stores the list of functionality leader capable nodes in it |
|-------------------|--|
| fun_leader_i | functionality leader Id stored by a node i |
| FN | set of functionality nodes |
| FS | set of failed states |
| G = (CN, L) | Graph with computing nodes CN and set of links L |
| L | total possible loss due to cyber attack |
| l_id | newly elected leader Id |
| l_child_i | list of child nodes of a node i |
| $leader_i$ | a node i stores the system leader Id in it |
| M_0 | initial marking |
| M(P) | set of markings |
| Р | set of places |
| $parent_i$ | parent node of a node i |
| p_i | frequency of successful attack a_i |
| Q | transition rate matrix |
| R | radius of graph G |
| RI | cyber risk impact |
| r_list | a 2D list with two fields. First field contains node Id and |
| | second field contains rank of a node |
| S | set of sensors |
| S_{Dj} | strength of defence measure Dj |
| s_em_id | sender of the election message |
| sd_{ij} | synchronic distance between transitions t_i and t_j |
| sec_leader_i | security leader Id stored by a node i |
| s_{ta} | targeted system attribute or functionality |
| $s_x(t)$ | measurement of sensor x at time t |
| slc_list_i | a node i stores the list of security leader capable nodes in it |
| $sm_x(t)$ | operational state of system at time t |
| $s_{\gamma}(v,t)$ | threat strength |
| SN | set of security nodes |

| T | set of transitions |
|------------------------|---|
| t_list | list of transient leader |
| ta | target security attribute |
| Tf | set of functionality tasks |
| toe | type of election, if the election is initiate to elect the functionality |
| | leader then $toe = 1$, if the election is initiate to elect security |
| | leader then $toe = 0$ |
| tol | type of leader, $tol=1$ functionality leader, $tol=0$ security leader |
| ton_i | type of node, if node <i>i</i> is a functionality node then $ton_i = 1$, |
| | if node <i>i</i> is a security node then $ton_i = 0$ |
| Ts | set of security tasks |
| v | existing vulnerability |
| lpha' | deviation in intended functionality |
| $\beta_{lpha}(t)$ | security goals at time t |
| δt | threat duration |
| γ | an active threat |
| λ_{ij} | transition rate of state i to state j |
| $\omega_i(t)$ | attack impact per unit time |
| π | probability distribution |
| π_i | the steady-state probability of being in state M_i |
| $p\{t_{k\gamma} M_j\}$ | probability of firing a malicious transition $t_{k\gamma}$ |
| $\sigma(t)$ | disturbance factor for sensor values |